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OSD-Level Acquisition Policy and Process Regimes, 
1970-2009 
1. The Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council 
(DSARC), 1970–1982 
 
2. The Post-Carlucci Initiatives DSARC, 1983–1989 
 
3. The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), 1990–1993 
 
4. Acquisition Reform (AR), 1994–2000 
 
5. The DAB – Post Acquisition Reform, 2001–2009   
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Useful reference: J. Ronald Fox, Defense Acquisition Reform, 1960 to 2009: An 
Elusive Goal (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2011). 
The Outcome Metric—Growth in Program Acquisition 
Unit Cost (PAUC) 
 The research used PAUC growth for 151 Major Defense Acquisition 
Programs (MDAPs) that passed MS II/B during FY 1970–FY 2007.  
 
 Each of these MDAPs went into production 
 There are no cancelled programs in the sample. 
 
 PAUC growth is measured from the MS II/B baseline and 
normalized to the MS II/B total quantity acquired. 
 
 PAUC growth over the entire acquisition cycle is associated with 
the Fiscal Year in which the MDAP passed MS II/B; for example: 
 
 PAUC growth for the F-22 over FY 1991-FY 2006 is assigned to FY 1991, the 
year in which the F-22 passed MS II. 
 The average PAUC growth for FY 1987–FY 1993 is the average quantity 
normalized PAUC growth of all MDAPs that passed MS II during those years. 
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DSARC  (1970–1982) 32% 
Post Carlucci Initiatives  
DSARC (1983-1989) 19% 
DAB  (1990–1993) 36% 
Acquisition Reform 
 (AR) (1994–2000) 66% 
DAB post AR (2001–2007) 19% 
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1970–1980 35% 1981–1986 12% 
1987–2002 53% 2003–2007 7% 
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Average PAUC growth is much higher for MDAPs that passed MS II/B during 
bust periods than those that passed during boom periods. 
Methodology 
5 
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained  Funding Environment (FY) 
Relatively Accommodating  
Funding Environment (FY) 
Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review 
Council (DSARC)   
1970–1980 1981–1982 
Post Carlucci Initiatives 
DSARC 1987–1989 1983–1986 
Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) 1990–1993 
No observations 
Acquisition Reform (AR) 1994–2000 
DAB post AR 2001–2002 2003–2007 
We have eight natural experiments on the effect of acquisition 
regime and three on the effect of funding climate. 
Average PAUC Growth by Acquisition Regime and 
Funding Climate 
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Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained  Funding Environment (FY) 
Relatively Accommodating  
Funding Environment (FY) 
Defense Systems 
Acquisition Review 
Council (DSARC)   
1970–1980 35% (42) 1981–1982 11% (6) 
Post Carlucci Initiatives 
DSARC 1987–1989 34% (11) 1983–1986 13% (29) 
Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) 1990–1993 36% (11) 
No observations 
Acquisition Reform (AR) 1994–2000 66% (27) 
DAB post AR 2001–2002 57% (6) 2003–2007 7% (19) 
Loosely, acquisition regime does not matter for PAUC growth but funding 
climate does.  
Statistical Analysis and Related Issues 
 An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was done for each budget 
climate.  For neither climate were any of the differences across 
regimes in average PAUC growth statistically significant. 
 A standard t-test was used to test the differences in average PAUC 
growth between funding regimes. Average PAUC growth in the bust 
period was significantly higher (P≤ 0.01) in each of the three cases 
for which the comparison could be made.  
 There is a distinct bust-boom-bust-boom pattern in funding climate 
over 1970-2007.  If budget climate is a proxy for some other 
variable(s) those variables would need to have the same pattern.  
There are no obvious candidates. 
 The paper (Appendix B) provides evidence that PAUC growth is not 
systematically influenced by changes in budget climate post MS 




 40 of the 151 MDAPs in the sample had a PAUC growth of ≥ 50%. 
Not weighted by program size, these account for just over three-
quarters of cost growth. 
 36 of these 40 programs passed MS II/B in bust periods.  Nearly 40 percent of all 
programs that passed MS II/B in bust periods had a PAUC growth of at least 50 
percent. 
 Only 4 programs with PAUC growth of at least 50 percent passed MS II/B in a 
boom period. 
 
 29 of the 151 MDAPs for which the study had a PAUC growth 
estimate showed negative cost growth. 
 Nearly one-third of the MDAPs that passed MS II/B in a boom funding climate 
had negative PAUC growth. 
 The frequency of negative PAUC growth was much lower (about 12 percent) in 




The PAUC growth problem is not systemic; it is largely one of programs 
that passed MS II/B in bust funding climates and had exceptionally high 
PAUC growth. 
Implications for Debates on Acquisition Reform 
 It seems unlikely that further changes in the acquisition 
process will have a major effect on PAUC growth. 
 
 The relevant context for understanding very high PAUC 
growth is the interface between the acquisition process 
and the program/budget process. 
 
 The underlying cause of persistent high PAUC growth is 
not a deeply established culture of the DoD acquisition 
organizations and their professional employees. 
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Briefing is drawn from IDA Paper P-5126 
IDA Paper P-5126, “Evidence on the Effect of DoD Acquisition 
Policy and Process on Cost Growth of Major Defense 




To obtain a hard copy, contact IDA Library Reference Services: 
 Phone: (703) 845-2087 
 E-mail: refdesk@ida.org  
 
10 
The hard copy of the paper comes with a CD containing the data used and  
spreadsheets used in the PAUC growth computations. 
Backup 
Number of MDAPs with PAUC Growth ≥ 50 Percent 
Acquisition Regime Topline Relatively Constrained (FY) 
Topline Relatively 
Accommodating (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 15 of 42 1981–1982 0 of 6 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 2 of 11 1983–1986 3 of 29 
DAB  1990–1993 3 of 11 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 13 of 27 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 3 of 6 2003–2007 1 of 19 
Total 36 of 97  (37%) 4 of 54  (7%) 
12 
The probability of  a PAUC growth ≥ 50% was 27 percentage points 
higher in a Relatively Constrained funding climate than in a Relatively 
Accommodating funding climate. 
Percent of PAUC Growth Accounted for by Observations ≥ 50% 
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Climate (FY) 
Relatively Accommodating 
Funding Climate (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 73% 1981–1982 0 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 62% 1983–1986 70% 
DAB  1990–1993 64% 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 90% 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 75% 2003–2007 43% 
13 
Not weighted by program size, MDAPs with a PAUC growth of ≥ 50% 
account for just over three-quarters of quantity adjusted cost growth. 
Number of MDAPs with Negative PAUC Growth 
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Climate (FY) 
Relatively Accommodating 
Funding Climate (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 5 of 42 1981–1982 2 of 6 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 2 of 11 1983–1986 10 of 29 
DAB  1990–1993 1 of 11 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 4 of 27 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 0 of 6 2003–2007 5 of 19 
Total 12 of 97  (12%) 17 of 54  (31%) 
14 
The probability of  negative PAUC growth is 21 percentage points lower for 
MDAPs that passed MS II/B in a Relatively Constrained funding climate.  
Alternative Explanations for Negative PAUC Growth and 
PAUC Growth ≥ 50 Percent 
 P-5126 concludes that “…the relevant context for understanding PAUC 
growth is the interface between the acquisition process and the resource 
allocation process.” 
 This conclusion includes two possibilities: 
– Major acquisition programs more frequently adopt more optimistic costing and 
programmatic assumptions in Relatively Constrained funding climates compared 
to Relatively Accommodating climates. 
– In Relatively Constrained funding climates, some MDAPs are issued top-down 
guidance (possibly from the Program/Budget process) that results in more 
optimistic costing and programmatic assumptions. In Accommodating funding 
climates, some MDAPs are over-funded so that they can be used as a “bank” to 
hold funds for later commitment. 
 Each explanation implies more negative PAUC growth in Accommodating 
climates and more MDAPs with PAUC growth of ≥ 50% in Relatively 
Constrained climates. 
 Each of the two explanations probably is correct in some instances. 
 P-5126 did not attempt to distinguish between the two statistically. 
15 
Bias in the MS II/B PAUC Estimate and the Frequency of PAUC 









Growth Relatively Constrained 
Funding Climate 
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained Funding Climate (FY) 
Relatively Accommodating 
Funding Climate (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 21% (22) 1981–1982 22% (4) 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 22% (7) 1983–1986 14% (16) 
DAB  1990–1993 22% (7) 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 22% (10) 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 29% (3) 2003–2007 10% (13) 
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Note: Numbers in parentheses are the number of observations available. 
Average PAUC Growth Excluding Negative Observations 
and Observations ≥ 50 Percent 
 Some decrease in variation is guaranteed by exclusion of the negative 
observations and those of ≥ 50%. Even so, there is a remarkable 
consistency across the cells of PAUC growth. 
 ANOVA did not find statistically significant difference in PAUC growth across 
the acquisition regimes for either funding climate. 
 PAUC growth was significantly lower in the Accommodating climate for the 
DAB post AR regime. 
(1)  Acquisition Regime in Periods of Relatively  
Constrained Procurement Funding Climate  
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 35% (42) 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 34% (11) 
DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) 
AR 1994–2000 66% (27) 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 57% (6) 
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Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. 
The differences in average PAUC growth across acquisition regimes also are 
not statistically significant for the Relatively Constrained funding climate. 
(2)  Acquisition Regime in Periods of Relatively  
Accommodating Procurement Funding Climate  
Acquisition Regime Relatively Accommodating (FY) 
DSARC  1981–1982 11% (6) 




DAB post AR  2003–2007 7% (19) 
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Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. 
The differences in average PAUC growth across acquisition regimes are not 
statistically significant for the Relatively Accommodating funding climate. 
 
 (3) PAUC Growth and Procurement Funding Climate Given 
Acquisition Regime  
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1980 35% (42) 1981–1982 11% (6) 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1987–1989 34% (11) 1983–1986 13% (29) 
DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 66% (27) 
DAB post AR  2001–2002 57% (6) 2003–2007 7% (19) 
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Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. 
Average PAUC growth was significantly less in the Relatively 
Accommodating funding climate for each of the three acquisition 
regimes for which the comparison can be made.  
Selection of Break Points between Funding Climates 
 This research used only two funding climate categories—Relatively 
Constrained and Relatively Accommodating. 
 Our touchstone in selection of break points was major shifts in the 
expectation about future funding of senior DoD decision makers. 
 We used three events to identify the break points between funding climates: 
– The invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR in late December 1979. 
– The passage of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act in December 1985; and 
– The terrorist attack on the U.S. on Sept. 11, 2001. 
 Senior decision makers could reasonably expect each of these events to 
result in major and sustained changes in the defense funding climate. 
 After examining contemporary policy statements and events we selected: 
– FY 1981 as the first year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; 
– FY 1986 as the final year of the Carter-Reagan buildup; and 
– FY 2003 as the first year of the post-9/11 defense buildup. 
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PAUC Growth Acquisition Regime and Procurement Funding 
Climate—Alternative Break Points 
Acquisition Regime Relatively Constrained (FY) Relatively Accommodating (FY) 
DSARC  1970–1979 37% (39) 1980–1982 7% (9) 
Post Carlucci DSARC 1986–1989 25% (17) 1983–1985 14% (23) 
DAB 1990–1993 36% (11) 
No observations 
AR 1994–2000 66% (27) 
DAB post AR  No observations 2001–2007 19% (25) 
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Note: Number of observations available in parentheses. 
Two conclusions change if the alternative break points are used: 
1. Average PAUC growth for the  Acquisition Reform years is significantly 
higher than in other acquisition regimes. 
2. The difference in PAUC growth between the two funding climates is not 
statistically significant for the Post Carlucci DSARC acquisition regime. 
